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In letters to the journals Science and Nature
(1, 2), 22 virologists notified the research
community of their interest in expand-
ing research to develop strains of the
already deadly H7N9 Asian influenza virus
that would be transmissible via aerosols
among mammals, thus creating potential
pandemic pathogens. PPPs are defined as
pathogens that are potentially highly con-
tagious, potentially highly deadly, and not
currently present in the human popula-
tion. Mammalian contagious avian flu, the
1918 pandemic flu, and SARS are examples.
The letter writers cite their scientific rea-
sons for the need for such research, much
the same reasons as given by those work-
ing on similar projects for the H5N1 avian
flu virus (3, 4). This new proposed research
signals wider interest in making dangerous
influenza viruses (5, 6) contagious in mam-
mals via respiratory aerosols. At present,
there are no international regulations or
guidelines in place to decide whether such
a research project should proceed.
Now is the time to address the next crit-
ical question: what is the likelihood that
one of these viruses will escape from a lab
and seed the very pandemic the researchers
claim they are trying to prevent? As we shall
estimate, that probability could be as high
as 27%, a risk too dangerous to live with.
First, from the calculations in two in-
depth pandemic risk analyses (7–9), there
is a substantial probability that a pandemic
with over a 100-million fatalities could be
seeded from an undetected lab-acquired
infection (LAI), if a single infected lab
worker spreads infection as he moves about
in the community. From the Klotz (2014)
analysis, there is about a 1–30% probability,
depending on assumptions, that, once
infected, the lab worker will seed a pan-
demic. This large probability spread arises
from varying the average number of peo-
ple infected by an infected person between
1.4 and 3.0 (R0, in standard epidemiology
notation), varying the details of commutes
to and from work on public transporta-
tion, and whether infected acquaintances
are quarantined before spreading infec-
tion. The Merler (2013) study, based on
a computer-generated population grid of
size and varying density of the Netherlands,
supports our concern over a lab escape not
being detected until it is too late: “there
is a non-negligible probability (5–15%),
strongly dependent on reproduction num-
ber and probability of developing clinical
symptoms, that the escape event is not
detected at all.”
Different methodologies were used in
the Klotz (2014) and Merler (2013) risk
analyses. Additional analyses are needed
using other methodologies, such as the
mathematical model employed for SARS
(10), which hopefully will lead to some
consensus on risk. The Klotz and Merler
studies, however, are the first to raise these
concerns and point to valid issues about the
potential risks from a single LAI.
Given such a dire predicted outcome by
the existing studies, the critical question
is: what is the probability that a worker
acquires an undetected infection in the lab
in the first place? To answer this question,
we reproduce here one part of the Klotz
(2014) analysis: the probability of an escape
through an LAI from at least one of the
many labs expected to be involved in this
research enterprise.
A 2013 Centers for Disease Control
report is a significant source of recent data
on LAIs (11). The report documents four
undetected or unreported LAIs in regis-
tered US Select Agent, high-containment
BSL-3 labs between 2004 and 2010. An
undetected or unreported LAI implies an
escape when the infected person leaves the
lab. The report identifies an average of 292
registered Select Agent BSL-2, BSL-3, and
BSL-4 labs operating over those 7 years, for
a total of 292× 7= 2,044 lab years. Unfor-
tunately, the study does not break down
numbers into BSL-2, BSL-3, and BSL-4 labs
or lab years.
Thus, the probability of escape for a sin-
gle year, p1, can only be calculated as 4
LAIs/2,044 lab years= 0.002 or 0.2% per
lab per year. This is clearly an underesti-
mate since BSL-2 and BSL-4 labs contribute
to the denominator. (The denominator
used here, 2,004, equals the number of BSL-
2 plus number of BSL-3 plus number of
BSL-4 labs. But the denominator in our cal-
culation should be just the number of BSL-
3 labs, so the denominator is overestimated
and the percent escape is then underesti-
mated. Although requested, the CDC has
not supplied us with the number of BSL-3
labs for us to do the exact calculation.) This
basic probability is consistent with that for
SARS escapes in Asia through LAIs (12) and
with all known escapes from BSL-4 labs
in the Soviet Union from LAIs and Great
Britain from a mechanical failure (13).
To illustrate potential risk, the probabil-
ity of no escape from a single lab in a single






is the probability of no escape from N labs
in Y years. And
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is the probability of at least one escape from
N labs in Y years.
Given the Science and Nature articles
listed above (1, 2), it is reasonable to assume
that at least 10 labs will undertake this
research and that this work would continue
for 10 years, so
pat least one = 1− (1− 0.002)10×10 = 0.18
(3)
or an 18% likelihood of at least one escape
from at least one lab for the whole research
enterprise, almost 100-times greater than
the likelihood for a single lab in a single
year.
We noted above that the probability
p1= 0.2% is conservative, estimated from
the CDC data alone. The first Department
of Homeland Security risk assessment
for the planned National Bio- and Agro-
Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas esti-
mated a significantly higher escape risk,
over 70% likelihood for the 50-year life of
the facility (14), which works out to be a
basic probability of escape, p1= 2.4% per
year. The National Research Council (14)
overseeing the risk assessment remarked
“The . . . estimates indicate that the proba-
bility of an infection resulting from a labo-
ratory release of FMDv from the NBAF in
Manhattan, Kansas approaches 70% over
50 years (see Figure 3-1) with an economic
impact of $9–50 billion. The committee
finds that the risks and costs could well
be significantly higher than that. . .” While
the DHS subsequently lowered the escape
risk to 0.11% for the 50-year lifetime (14),
the NRC committee (14) was highly criti-
cal of the new calculations:“The committee
finds that the extremely low probabilities
of release are based on overly optimistic
and unsupported estimates of human error
rates, underestimates of infectious mater-
ial available for release, and inappropriate
treatment of dependencies, uncertainties,
and sensitivities in calculating release prob-
abilities.” We have more trust in the NRC
committee conclusions, as they have no
skin in the game.
With this higher number, which we
take as a worst-case scenario, the likeli-
hood of at least one escape from 10 labs
in 10 years becomes 91%, almost a cer-
tainty. It follows that, if the likelihood of
one LAI leading to a pandemic is 30% in
the worst-case scenario, the likelihood of an
LAI-caused pandemic resulting from this
whole research enterprise could be as high
as 30× 91%= 27%, a likelihood that is too
dangerous to live with, as we noted. While
this represents a worst-case scenario, it is
not improbable.
Recent self-reported mistakes at the
CDC (15), involving a particularly deadly
strain of anthrax removed from BSL-3 con-
tainment and H5N1 Asian bird flu released
from the CDC laboratories altogether, lend
support to our concern that the probabil-
ity of escape may be much greater than
the 0.2% per lab per year from just LAIs.
The CDC report spawned a congressional
inquiry (16) and led to dozens of news-
paper articles with concerns about lack of
safety in high-containment laboratories.
Our concern is shared by many virol-
ogists and epidemiologists. A recent letter
to the President of the European Commis-
sion (17) co-signed by 56 scientists from
more than a dozen countries warned, “The
probabilities of a lab accident that leads
to a global spread of an escaped mutated
virus are small but finite, while the impact
of global spread could be catastrophic.”
The European Centre for Disease Preven-
tion and Control (18) weighed-in with its
concerns as well, as did the Cambridge
Working Group (19). It must be noted that
some of the signers of the European Com-
mission letter and the Cambridge Work-
ing Group’s consensus statement are the
same.
The risk of a man-made pandemic from
a lab escape is not hypothetical. Lab escapes
of high-consequence pathogens resulting
in transmission beyond lab personnel have
occurred (20, 21). The historical record
reveals lab-originated outbreaks and deaths
due to the causative agents of the 1977
pandemic flu, smallpox escapes in Great
Britain, Venezuelan equine encephalitis in
1995, SARS outbreaks after the SARS epi-
demic, and foot and mouth disease in the
UK in 2007. Ironically, these labs were
working with pathogens to prevent the very
outbreaks that they ultimately caused.
Do benefits outweigh risks? Those who
support PPP experiments either believe
the probability of PPP escape is infin-
itesimal or the benefits in preventing a
pandemic are great enough to justify the
risk. In making decisions for what lines
of research will lead to new knowledge,
experts must rely on intuition honed by
years of research in a particular field. In the
case of this PPP research, in our opinion
it would take extraordinary benefits and
significant reduction of risk via extraor-
dinary biosafety measures to correct such
a massive overbalance of highly uncertain
benefits to too-likely risks (Wain-Hobson,
2013).
Whatever number we are gambling
with, it is clearly far too high a risk to
human lives. This Asian bird flu virus
research to develop strains transmissible
via aerosols among mammals, and perhaps
some other PPP research as well, should for
the present be banned. We must empha-
size that we have been considering only
a very small subset of pathogen research.
Most pathogen research should proceed
unimpeded by unnecessary regulations.
Special precautions in BSL-4 laborato-
ries for work with PPPs should be adopted
(22). These would include:
• Training a full-time technical staff for
work with PPPs. Experiments could be
directed by scientists outside the labora-
tory using modern audio-video technol-
ogy.
• Requiring the staff to follow up extended
work shifts with periods of quarantine
before they leave the containment area
to assure that no PPP escapes from the
containment area through an LAI.
• Restricting these PPP laboratories to
remote locations, where an aerosol
escape or other containment failure
would pose the least risk of infecting an
outside community.
We label BSL-4 laboratories with the
special precautions, BSL-4+. While PPP
experiments would be carried out pri-
marily under BSL-4+ containment, BSL-3
containment with the special precautions
might suffice for some work.
Given the global threat, the interna-
tional community should insist on discus-
sions leading to an international agreement
that would require the strictest oversight to
conduct this particular research anywhere.
To place responsibility with the interna-
tional community where it belongs and
to provide maximum transparency, policy
makers should require that international
inspectors have access to facilities at any
time on short notice.
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As it stands, there is no proactive over-
sight nor regulations for this PPP research,
so any and all of the world’s nations
can carry out this dangerous work with-
out regard to consequences. But conse-
quences would be shared by all of us. In
the meantime, insurance companies who
routinely provide insurance for biological
research should consider excluding such
risky research from coverage.
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